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Abstract
This paper analyzes labour market position of unemployed older individuals after the implementation of two
major pension reforms in France. We use the French Force Labour Survey for the period 2003-2011 to assess
the effects of the 2003 and the 2010 pension reforms on the exit rate from unemployment of individuals aged
over 54. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we look at the effects of these reforms on the exit from
unemployment to employment, and into inactivity. We find that the 2003 pension reform reduces significantly
the exit to employment, while there is no significant impact of the pension reform on the exit to inactivity. For
the 2010 reform, we show that the reform leads to an increase of the probability to go back to work. At the
same time, the transition out of labour force through inactivity exit also rises. Unemployment and other social
schemes are used as a bridge to retire early.
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Since the early 1970s, older workers, aged 50 or over, the labour market has been characterized by a low
employment rate for most of European countries. The situation is particularly worrying in France where the
labour force participation rate is one of the lowest among developed countries. For example, 47.1 % of those,
aged between 55 and 64, were employed in 2014 (the rate is more striking for those aged between 60 and 64
(23.3%)) and the employment rates are lower than those observed in the European Union (EU27) (see Figure
1). Another important aspect of labour market of senior workers concerns the unemployment rate which has
risen recently. Since the 2008 crisis, the situation for the over fifties is getting worse with an unemployment
rate increasing, from 4% in 2008 to 7.5% in 20141, due largely to the crisis and measures which exempt older
unemployed workers from actively seeking employment. This fact is illustrated in Figure 2, where we present
the French unemployment rate of workers aged between 55 and 64 years old for the past fourteen years. Average
unemployment rates are nearly around 4.5% until 2007 and displays an important increase by 1.4 percentage
point in 2009, and the trend persists up to now. Although older people are less exposed to unemployment
than the young, they experience difficulties in leaving this state. The situation is particularly difficult for
older jobseekers. Their chances of re-employment are reduced thereby, increasing the length of time spent in
unemployment, and then find themselves in a long-term unemployment trap. For example, in 2012, 61% of
unemployed workers aged over 55 years where in long-term unemployment, compared to 47% in the OECD.
Furthermore in almost one in two older workers do not move directly from employment to retirement. Before
retirement, older unemployed tend to experience a lengthy spell of unemployment at the end of their working
life2.
The low employment rate of older workers and the difficulties encountered in returning to employment have
attracted attention in public and political debates in many European countries. It has also raised questions
about the sustainability of contribution-based state pension systems in context of aging population. In this
context, policy-makers have taken several measures in order to improve the labour market participation of
older individuals. At the same time one of the main features of pension reforms was to increase the minimum
retirement age.
This paper examines the effect of the increase of number of years contributions induced by pension reforms
on the unemployment of older workers in France. The main objective is therefore to assess the impact of the
pension reforms introduced in France on exit rate out of unemployment and into employment of unemployed
older workers. The analysis is focused on workers aged 55 and older, and whether the introduction of these




A first indicator of the difficulties encountered by older workers in the labour market can be found in the return
to employment of an unemployed older worker compared to younger unemployed workers. Figures 3 to 7 show
the exit rate from unemployment to employment drawn from the French Labour Force Survey (FLS) for the
period 2003-2011 (Figures 3 and 5) and from unemployment to inactivity (Figures 6 and 7). The exit rate from
unemployment to employment is low for the seniors and decreases with age. The exit rate is generally lower
for the 55-59 age-group than for the 50-54 age-group. From 2003 up to 2008, workers aged 55 and older tend
to experience fewer exits to employment than unemployed workers with younger age groups. After 2008, the
exit to employment for seniors increased thereby reducing the gap between age-groups. Similar conclusions
appear for the exit to inactivity which is higher for the unemployed in the 55 and over age bracket. Between 55
and 59, the transition from unemployment to inactivity is greater than to employment, due to the possibilities
of leaving the labour force through early retirement or specific schemes for older unemployed workers. A
decrease is observed after the crisis, for the over 50s but the decline is more pronounced for the 55-59. At the
same time, there is a slight increase in the exit to employment for seniors, although older unemployed workers
remain longer in unemployment.
In this paper, we analyse how the effects of the pension reforms implemented in the last decade in France on
employment of older people have affected the exit from unemployment. The period of study allows us to in-
vestigate the impact of two main pension reforms on the labour market of older workers in France: the 2003
and 2010 reforms. The main finding is that the different pension reforms implemented in France appear to
have limited effects on exits out of unemployment for older unemployed persons. The 2003 French reform has
effects on the re-employment of unemployed older workers. In almost all cases, the effects are significantly
different from zero. However we find no impact of the reform on the exit to inactivity. For the 2010 reform,
we find evidence of an increase of the probability of going back to work, while the 2010 reform seems to
have some significant effects in increasing transitions out of labour force. The results are robust to alternative
specifications. This paper is organized as follows: We begin the paper by first presenting an overview of the
literature relative to employment of older workers in Section 1. Section 2 gives a briefly review the organi-
sation of French social security system to understand the reforms recently enacted and their consequences on
the labour market. Section 3 describes the data set used before presenting the approach applied to analyse the
effects of reforms on the labour market of older workers. Section 4 reports the results of our model . Section 5
presents some sensitivity analysis before concluding in section 6.
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1. Institutions and Unemployment of Older Workers: Evidence from the Empirical Literature
Even though an improvement of the participation rate among older persons is observed in recent years, the
employment of older people remains low compared to most of the major EU countries. France is also faced with
the challenge of higher unemployment among older persons for whom it remains difficult to find employment
after age of 55 in France. The unemployment rate is still high with almost one in four unemployed workers
aged over 49. It is an important policy issue to have effective ways of helping older unemployed people to
remain into labour market in the context of an increasing unemployment rate.
Several reasons can explain the low labour force participation rate of older workers. One of them is the labour
market policies implemented in France which has a tradition of early-retirement and special treatment for older
unemployed workers since 1980, since the access to disability benefits or unemployment benefits, enabled
them to exit early from the labour market. Another factor that affects the participation in labour market is
directly related to the jobseekers’ decisions. In a search model, if the reservation wage of the unemployed
jobseeker is higher, the utility of being in unemployment state is higher, involving a lower probability to leave
unemployment.
Difficulties encountered by the older workers in finding employment could also explain this low rate with the
issues related to age discrimination and negative stereotypes of older workers’ productivity (Neumark (2008),
Neumark and Button (2014)). In addition, the financial difficulties encountered by the social system in a con-
text of aging society, the persistently low rate of participation of older workers in the labour force becomes
a central question in national and international politics. Delaying retirement by working longer is one of the
levers used to finance the French social system. Having a job or being able to find an employment at older ages
is essential for the sustainability of the French social model. Given the difficulties for a senior to find a job,
getting older unemployed workers back into work becomes a major problem. In an attempt to address these
issues, public authorities and social partners have taken numerous measures to keep seniors in employment
and to promote greater participation of seniors in the labour market over the last 20 years. These measures
have been strengthened by the National Action Plan on employment for seniors (2006-2010) with the aim of
reaching an employment rate of 50 % for the 55-64 age group in 2010 (such as the “contrat senior” temporary
contract, for up to 18 months, for those aged over 56). The reforms implemented in France, with the raising of
the legal minimum retirement age and the measures to encourage workers to remain longer in the labour force,
are a key to increase the labour market participation of older workers and to limit the consequences of aging
population on financing social welfare and on economic growth.
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Previous studies have analyzed how pension reforms affect the labour force behaviour of seniors. They have
found that the raising in the retirement age entails an increase in labour force participation. Mastrobuoni
(2009) examines the impact of the pension reform that has raised the normal age of retirement and reduced
benefits in the United States. He finds that the policy changes have significant impact on the labour supply
of older workers. Retirement is delayed for the cohorts affected by the reform by one month for each of two
month increase in the normal age of retirement (or statutory retirement age). Garcı´a-Pe´rez, Jime´nez-Martı´n and
Sa´nchez-Martı´n (2013) analyse the impact of the 2002 pension reform implemented in Spain on older workers.
The reform delays the minimum age of retirement from age 60 to 61 in order to reduce the strategic use of the
benefit unemployment benefit program by employers and employees as a means of early retirement. Using a
double difference approach on administrative data, the authors find that the reform has significant impact on
workers’ decisions. The flow transition from unemployment to employment decreases significantly after the
implementation of the law. They also show that employers’ decisions change after the application of the law.
The firing rate at 58 and 59 increases, reflecting the strategic use of unemployment insurance by companies for
their employees to withdraw early from the workforce.
The French case has also been studied by for example Aubert (2012) who examines the impact of the 1993
French pension reform on the retirement age. Using administrative data from “re´gime ge´ne´ral” for French
wage-earners of the private sector, Aubert finds a significant increase in age of retirement for individuals af-
fected by the 1993 pension reform. He also shows that the probability of retiring early increases significantly by
encouraging individuals to claim specific benefits (disability pensions, long careers,...). Bozio (2008) reports
similar results of the effects of the 1993 reform. The extension of the minimum contribution period for pension
eligibility has positive effects on the employment of older workers aged between 55 and 60. The author shows
that the increase in senior’s employment is driven by two mechanisms: the distance to retirement age (at 60)
and the missing years to full rate pension. He finds a negative impact of distance to retirement on labour supply
for men over 56 years of age. The probability of leaving employment is lower when the distance to retirement
increases. The results suggest there are strong incentives to leave the labour market when the duration until the
minimum contribution years is short. Benallah (2011) analyzes the financial incentives induced by the 2003
pension reform on the employment of older workers. For the 1944 generation, the “surcoˆtes” (i.e. penalty rates)
lead to a raise in the probability of employment after 60, the age of minimum retirement, by 7 percent points
and an increase around 0.2 years of the age of liquidation rights. However, Benallah points out that these results
are specific to the cohort studied and the impact on all cohorts should be examined to evaluate the effect of the
reforms in a long-term perspective.
Finally Staubli and Zweimu¨ller (2013) evaluate the impact of the 2000 and 2004 reforms in Austria which have
increase the age of early retirement. Using administrative data on private-sector wage earners, they show that
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the policy changes have reduced retirement among seniors (by 19 percent points among men affected and 25
percent point among women affected). They also find that the increase in the early retirement age leads to a
higher unemployment rate of older workers (increase in the demand for unemployment insurance of 10 percent
points among men and 11 percent pints among women). Tightening access to retirement can moderate the
effects of pension reforms on employment and leads to substitution effects between early retirement schemes.
Alternative schemes such as unemployment, sickness or disability leave can be used to leave the labour force
before being eligible to full pension entitlement. Mostly studies which have analysed the effect of pension re-
forms suggest that these measures are effective in increasing the employment of seniors. However, few studies
evaluate how the pension reforms affect the labour market behaviour of unemployed older workers. Our study
examines the impact of recent pension reforms on the labour market behaviour of unemployed older workers.
2. A Brief Overview of the French Pension System and Its Reforms
The French pension system is divided into three major occupational groups: the private sector, the public
sector and the self-employed. Wage-earners in the private sector which represent about 70 percent of the
labour force, the pension depends on two mandatory pillar schemes. The first pillar, the “Caisse Nationale
d’Assurance Vieillesse des Travailleurs Salarie´s” (CNAV), is a general regime (re´gime ge´ne´ral) which pays a
basic pension based on years of contributions and on a reference wage. The pension system is based on pay-
as-you-go (PAYG) financing. The system, based on solidarity between generations: current contributions from
workers and employers, based on earnings, are used to pay current pensions of the retired individuals. Pensions
received are proportional to the number of years that a worker has made contributions and to a reference wage.
The conditions required to receive a full rate pension are: to have contributed a minimum duration (from 40
years to 41.5 years following the reforms, see in section 2.1 for details) and to have reached the minimum age of
retirement (from 60 to 62 years - 2010 reform) or to have reached the mandatory age retirement (65 to 67 years
- after the 2010 reform). For a full career, workers are entitled to a pension equal to 50 percent of a reference
wage computed on the basis of their past wages. However, the amount of pension can be reduced/increased in
the case of missing/additional quarters (see next section).
The second pillar is a compulsory complementary scheme constituted of two pension funds, depending on the
occupation categories. The “Association pour le Re´gime de Retraite comple´mentaire de Salarie´s” (ARRCO),
for all workers and the “Association Ge´ne´rale des Institutions de Retraite des Cadres” (AGIRC) for executives
only. These schemes are also based on a PAYG financing and pensions from these supplementary schemes are
based on system of points. Employees accumulate points during their careers, the value of which determines
the level of the pension received. Wage-earners belonging to the public sector (around 20% of the labour force)
6
or to large national firms and self-employers (around 10% of the labour force) have their specific schemes and
are covered by a single pillar. Public sector schemes provide more generous pensions (final six months salary
rather than the last 25 years for the private schemes). However since 2003 special schemes have been integrated
to the Social Security pension scheme in order to standardize the French retirement system.
In the remainder of this section we discuss the changes in the public pension scheme induced by these measures.
2.1. The 2003 Pension Reform
Reforms have been implemented over the last decade in order to remove the incentive to leave the labour force
early. The 2003 pension reform act introduced a series of measures to encourage seniors to remain in the labour
force. The first of these measures was to reduce the differences in length contributions between public and
private sector. This measure extended the number of years of contributions to qualify for a full rate to 40 years
(it was previously 37.5 years) in the public sector and bring it in line with the private sector between April 1st
2004 and January 1st 2009 (not studied in this paper). After this convergence of conditions between public and
private sectors, the duration of contributions required for a full rate pension was progressively increased for
the both sectors. The number of contribution years required to receive a full pension at age 60 was increased
gradually from 40 to 41 by January 2009. They increased by one quarter each year until 2012 for generations
born between 1949 and 1952 (see Table 9). To encourage people to work longer and to delay their exit from
the labour force, a system of bonus (“surcoˆte”) was introduced. In case of delayed retirement after reaching
the full rate, the pension would increase by 3% from January 1st 2004 per additional year of contribution (this
rate was increased later and it has been 5% since January 1st 2009). In contrast, the social security pension was
reduced for those retiring early. The 2003 reform corrected the penalty difference between sectors by reducing
the penalty for early retirement in the private sector and increasing it in the public sector where it was weaker.
A penalty of 5% per missing year is applied instead of 10 % in the private sector (1993 Balladur reform). Re-
tirement due to an employer decision was prohibited from January 2010.
Another aspect of the 2003 reform affected the eligibility conditions for early retirement. Early retirement
schemes allow older employees to stop work before retirement, while maintaining their income. In the private
sector, early retirement schemes can be partially or fully supported by firms. While private early retirements
depend entirely on the company, the State finances three types of mechanisms. The first early retirement
scheme is entirely financed by the State including the Allocation Spe´ciale du Fonds National pour l’Emploi
(AS-FNE), the Cessation Anticipe´e de certains Travailleurs Salarie´s (CATS), the Cessation anticipe´e des Tra-
vailleurs de l’Amiante (CAATA), the Pre´retraite progressive (PRP) allowing part-time work until retirement
and the l’Allocation de Remplacement pour l’Emploi (ARPE). With the aim of increasing the labour supply
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and demand of older employees, the 2003 pension reform tightened conditions for early retirement before age
of 60 through an increase in the number years of contributions (CATS, AS-FNE) or the abolition of several
measures (ARPE, FNE and PRP). The second early retirement scheme was introduced as a part of the 2003
pension reform and allows workers who started working at a very early age, who are disabled and with difficult
working conditions the possibility of retirement before the age of 60. One of the aims of the August 2003
law was to provide equity between generations of workers. From January 1st 2004, individuals with long ca-
reers or with disabilities could retire before the minimum age retirement (60 years old in 2003). Workers with
long careers, disability or who have worked in an unhealthy or physically environment can retire and claim
their pensions before reaching the legal minimum retirement age. The third component is the Dispense de
Recherche d’Emploi (DRE). The DRE allows unemployed older persons aged, above 55, to continue to receive
unemployment benefits and be exempted from actively seeking employment. The DRE recipient is no longer
considered as a job-seeker. It is equivalent to early retirement because it provides unemployment insurance
until the unemployed person becomes eligible for a full pension. Among the measures to increase the employ-
ment rate of seniors was the progressive abolition of the Dispense de Recherche d’Emploi3. Eligibility criteria
were progressively tightened after January 1st 2009 in order to lead to full abolition by January 1st 2012. The
minimum age to qualify for job search exemption was progressively increased from 57 to 60 (an increase of one
quarter per year in the requisite contributory period for entitlement to a full retirement pension since January
1st 2009). Measures taken for the 2009-2012 period (extending the required number of contribution years to
reach 41 years in 2012) have made it more difficult to retire early.
The 2003 law also includes a number of other measures to encourage older workers to remain into labour mar-
ket: relaxation of Delalande measure, which permitted to employers to pay a large penalty in order to be able to
fire workers aged above 55, the possibility to buy missing years of contributions, the extension of the maximum
retirement age to 70 and the introduction of a tax on early retirements fully financed by the companies in 2003
which was increased in 2008. The pension reform encourages contracting out to private sector and personal
savings with the introduction of private pension funds based on employees’ own savings. Occupational pension
schemes are arrangements established by employers to provide pensions for their employees. However, retire-
ment by capitalization remains marginal in France. Mandatory schemes (general and supplementary schemes)
still provide 85% of pensioners’ income. The remaining 15% comes from income from property and income
from retirement products where the main saving tool used for retirement remains life insurance (life insurance
and equity represent 45% and 24% of assets in 2013 respectively4).
3Law of 1 August 2008 concerning the rights and duties of job seekers
4Source: Observatoire des Retraites Europe´ennes Eres
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2.2. The 2010 Pension Reform
The 2010 Pension Reform has gradually increased the qualifying age of retirement from 60 to 62 years effective
as of July 1st 2011 to 2017 among generations born between 1951 and 1955, that is to 60 years and 4 months for
those born between the first July 1951 and December 31st 1951, 60 years and 9 months for the 1952 birth cohort,
and so on. Individuals born before the first July 1951 are not affected by this reform and can take their retirement
at the age of 60. The law also involved the extension of the number of years of contributions to qualify for a
full rate to 41 years. The minimum age for the full pension without the required years of contributions will
be raised from 65 to 67 between 2016 and 2022 (see Table 9): Once the age of automatic entitlement to a full
pension is reached, workers receive full pension even if the qualifying conditions are not satisfied. Among
measures to promote labour demand for older people, financial incentives were provided for companies who
hire unemployed workers over 55 and extended to companies that hire unemployed workers aged 45 or over in
2011. At the same time, the conditions for earlier exits have been reduced for a few exceptions such as early
retirement for those with difficult working conditions. Since July 1st 2011, employees affected by this measure
can receive a full pension benefits from the age of 60. Eligibility to retire at the age of 60 is maintained for
workers whose state of health has deteriorated as a result of difficult working conditions, aggressive physical
environment or due to specific working patterns. Workers with a permanent disability of at least 20% as a
consequence of an occupational disease or of a professional activity can also retire early. Since November 1st
2012, measures for those with long careers have extended to those who started working before the age of 20.
For these workers, retirement at the age of 60 is possible, provided that required years of contributions for the
full pension has been validated and the length of contributions should exceed two years than the length required
for their generation. The reform strengthens retirement savings with the establishment of several measures that
encourage retirement pension investment plans in companies which cover all employees. Next to this reform,
another took place in 2013 which increase the length of contribution period and the minimum retirement age5.
3. Empirical Analysis
3.1. The Data Used
The data used for the analysis are taken from the quarterly French Labour Force Surveys (FLFS) for the period
2003-2011 conducted by the National Institute of Statistical and Economic Information (INSEE)6. The FLFS
is a 18 month rotating panel of households where one sixth of the sample is replaced every quarters and each
person who participates in the survey appears at most in 6 consecutive surveys. The survey is representative of
5but not study here
6 the period before 2003 is not covered since there was a methodological change to the FLFS in 2003. Until 2002, households Ire
interviewed in March of each year during three consecutive years. One third of the households Ire replaced each year
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the French population aged fifteen and over. The FLFS provides information on socio-demographic status such
as age; gender; education level and occupation, and labour market status is known at each interview. One of the
advantages of using a rotating panel data is the large number of observations contained in each sample, which
guarantees a greater degree of representativeness compared to a long run of panel data (such as the PSID or the
BHPS).
In this paper, we want to examine how the probabilities to re-employment and to early retirement are affected by
pension reforms. For that, we focus on three dependent variables: The probability to exit unemployment (Exit
henceforth) which will then be distinguished between exit to employment (Employment henceforth) and exit
to inactivity (Inactivity henceforth). The FLFS allows us to construct flows of workers between three labour
market states according to the International Labour Office definitions (ILO): Employment, Unemployment and
Inactivity. And because individuals are followed for up to six quarters, we can observe the labour force state at
each quarter and when therefore workers experience a transition into employment or out of labour force. Some
of them remain unemployed throughout the period of the analysis. Therefore, we can construct the sample
which is comprised by individuals aged between the ages of 54 and 64 for males and females. To construct
the transition rate from unemployment, we select individuals who are unemployed in period t (i.e quarter t)
and could potentially leave unemployment in period t+ 1. We apply the same principle to construct the transi-
tion from unemployment to employment (or to inactivity) and select unemployed individuals in period t which
could leave unemployment state to employment (or to inactivity) in period t+ 1.
Table 1 contains characteristics of all individuals in the sample for the 2008-2009 period (column (1)) and for
the 2011 period (column (2)), which corresponds to the period before and after the pension reforms. Means and
proportions are displayed for both periods. Overall, the individual characteristics are stable between these two
periods except for few cases. For instance, the share of men is slightly higher than women in 2008-2009 period.
There is a slight decline in the average age which is around 58 years old, and we also find some differences in
educational level. However, the sample is characterized by a low educational level, and more than one third of
individuals have only basic secondary education. They are also characterized by a long spell of unemployment,
and more than 20% of them have experienced an unemployment duration of more than 36 months.
We now present interesting stylized facts obtained by the data from the FLFS for the same periods. Tables 4
and 5 summarize flows and transition rates of unemployed workers before and after the two pension reforms.
Transition matrix display flow out of unemployment for sample by groups affected or not by policy reform.
In Table 4, we report transition of unemployed workers for the 2008 to 2009 period, which corresponds to
one year before and one year after the 2003 pension reform. First, we note that a large share of unemployed
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workers leave labour force for inactivity before the reform. After the 2003 pension reform, we observe fewer
exit to employment and the exit to inactivity decreases, while the proportion of workers who remain unem-
ployed increases after the policy changes. More than 50% of unemployed workers remain unemployed after
the implementation of law. This period also correspond to the 2008 economic crisis, characterized by a high
level of job separation and which could explains the high level of unemployed workers flows. The proportion
of workers who remain in unemployment is more important for control group, while the increase in exit to em-
ployment is slightly stronger for treated group. Unemployed individuals experience less exit into employment
and remain more longer in unemployment. Unemployment seems to be used as a bridge until retirement for
older unemployed individuals.
For the 2010 pension reform (see Table 5), the share of transition of unemployed workers in different labour
market states has changed significantly from January 2011 to December 2011. Exits to employment and to
inactivity decrease after the implementation of the 2010 pension reform. Over this time period the share of
unemployed workers who shift back to work decreases from 27.9 to 14.2%, and to 37.9 to 20.6% among those
who become inactive after the policy reform. These decreases are accompanied by an increase of the share
of unemployed workers who remain unemployed after the reform. This increase of unemployed proportion is
particularly strong for individuals not affected by the pension reform. Our descriptive statistics indicate that the
share of share of workers which remain in unemployment increases with the policy reform. To clearly assess
the effects of pension reforms on labour market outcomes, we present in the next section the difference-in-
differences approach used.
3.2. The Empirical Model: Difference-in-Differences Estimation
In this section, we explore the effects of both pension reforms on labour market outcomes for unemployed older
workers. We focus especially on the effects on policy changes on job take-up, and also on exit to inactivity.
The approach used to analyze the potential effects of these measures is a standard difference-in-differences
method. The idea is to compare the evolution of the variable of interest, that is the exit from unemployment
to employment or to inactivity, for the treatment group relative the control group. In regression terms, the
approach as follows:
Yit = α+ β1DTreated + β2Postt + γ(DTreated ∗ Postt) +Xitδ + ψDt + uit (1)
where Yit is equal to 1 if the individual i leaves unemployment for employment/ inactivity in the quarter t given
that she was unemployed in the previous quarter, t − 1, and 0 otherwise. DTreated is the treatment group,
β1 is the treatment-group specific effect which accounts for average permanent differences between treated
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and control groups, and which is constant over time. Postt is a dummy variable which indicates whether
the dependent variable is observed after the implementation of the policy change. It is a control for the time
trend common to control and treatment groups. β2 is therefore the estimated post-treatment which is the same
for both treated and control groups. ψt are seasonal effects (quarters) and Xit represents individual specific
characteristics to control observable differences between individuals (gender, education level, marital status,
...). The policy effect is captured by γ, the interaction term between the treatment group dummy and the policy
year dummy. It captures the average effect of pension reform on exit rates.
The implementation of pension reforms, which affects specific groups of workers, creates a setting similar
to a natural experiment. The effects of the reforms can be identified because they introduce heterogeneity
in treatment among individuals. The gradual implementation of the reforms does not affect cohorts in the
same way. The number of years of contributions and the age at which the full rate pension will be reached
is different depending on year of birth. For individuals belonging to the same generation but with different
careers, reforms affect them differently. Whatever the reforms, individuals are not affected in the same way.
For example, workers born in 1949 have to contribute 161 quarters while those born in 1950 could contribute
162 quarters and those born in 1951 could contribute 164 quarters (see Table 9). The heterogeneity in the
reform implementation over time and across cohorts creates a natural experiment and allows us to define the
treated and control groups.
In our context, the treated group is composed of individuals affected by the pension reform. We define two
distinct treated groups because we analyse the effects of two pension reforms. For the 2003 pension reform,
the group of treatment is composed by individuals born between 1949 and 1952. The control group is by
definition the group of individuals not affected by the policy changes. For the 2003 pension reform, control
group is composed by individuals born between 1944 and 1948. We choose to define control group by older
generations of unemployed workers, aged between 61 and 64 in 2009, because the 2003 reform did not modify
the minimum age of retirement which was still possible at the age of 60 at this time (until the 2010 reform)
for these cohorts. Younger generations of unemployed workers are not used as alternative control group first,
because these generations are gradually concerned by the increase of length of contributions even if they are
not affected at the time of study; secondly, because when we test the common trend assumption we detect
significant effect on the ’fake’ reform (see Section 5), which suggests that this group is not a good control
group. Therefore we can exploit the heterogeneity introduced by the reform because control group are not
subject to the ’treatment’ during the whole period, while the treated group is subject to the new regulation. We
proceed in the same way to define both control and treated groups for the 2010 pension reform. Individuals
born from 1953 to 1957 are defined as the treated group, while those born from 1947 to 1952 are referred as the
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control group as there are not affected by the 2010 pension reform. We chose to restrict the age of individuals
between 49 and 64 years old to have homogenous groups as far as possible due to the identifying assumption
behind the difference-in-differences estimation which is that trends in employment outcomes would have been
the same between treated and control groups in the absence of a change in the policy.
We need next to define the period before and after the policy becomes effective. For the 2003 reform, the law
was passed in August 21st 2003 but its implementation was January 1st 2009 for the private sector (and July
1st 2011 for the 2010 Reform as noted in section 2). The year 2008 is therefore defined as the control year and
2009, 2009-2010 as the treatment years. Years before 2008 are not taken as control years since the first step of
the law was to increase the length of the contribution period in the public sector (effective between 2004 and
2008) and could influence our labour market outcomes. The year 2011 is not included in the post-treatment
period since another measure starts at that time. January 2010 until June 2011 is defined as the pre-treatment
period and July 2011 to December 2011 as the post-treatment period for the 2010 reform, as the policy was
effective as of July 2011. We check the robustness of the results by varying the window of period around the
reform threshold (one quarter before/after the implementation of the policy change, two quarters before/after,
...).
The validity of quasi natural experiment requires that the pension reforms are exogenous to shocks to partici-
pation rates of older workers. The difference-in-differences method is based upon the assumption that seasonal
effect would have been the same for both treated and control groups in the absence of the pension reform. We
test the common trend assumption in Section 5. Moreover control and treated groups seem to be comparable
in terms of observable characteristics. Tables 2 and 3 summarize the demographic characteristics of unem-
ployed individuals in each group. Overall, the null hypothesis of equality of means between treated and control
groups cannot be rejected apart from two cases: significant differences are found for college/university degree
(significant at 1%) and spell in unemployment for 18 to 23 months in Table 3.
4. The Effect of Pension Reform on Exit from Unemployment
In this section we analyse the effects of the reforms on leaving unemployment for employment, and on leaving
unemployment for early retirement. First of all, we begin by presenting the effects of the 2003 reform on exit
rates. Then we examine how the 2010 pension reform affects the transition out of unemployment.
We begin with the results of difference-in-differences estimates in Table 6 for exit out of unemployment
(columns (1) to (3)), then we distinguish between two transition exits which are presented separately: the
transition from unemployment into reemployment (columns (4) to (6)) and the transition from unemployment
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to inactivity (columns (7) to (9)). The dependent variable Yit is a dummy equal to 1 if an unemployed worker
in quarter t leaves unemployment in quarter t + 1 and 0 otherwise. The control group consists of individuals
born between 1944 and 1948, and the treated group refers to those born between 1949 and 1952.
4.1. Effects of the 2003 Reform on Re-Employment
Table 6 presents the results of the estimation on the probability of an unemployed older individual to go back to
work after the implementation of the 2003 pension reform. The first column reports the results without taking
account seasonality while the second column presents the difference-in-differences estimates which control
for seasonality. Columns 1 through 9 provide estimates of our key explanatory variable which is the effect of
pension reform (DTreated ∗ Postt). We do not report estimated results of other controls in Table 5 because
the main interest of our study is the impact of the policy changes on leaving unemployment states. The other
explanatory variables include sex, household composition characteristics, level of schooling.
The estimate which refers to the effect of the 2003 pension reform on unemployed workers, aged between 55
and 59 is DTreated ∗ Postt, and it reports the average treatment effect on the treatment group. A positive and
significant coefficient of γ means that the 2003 pension reform increases the exit rate out of unemployment.
In our case, the coefficient is negative and significantly different from zero. The 2003 reform reduced the
probability of leaving unemployment after the age of 50. However, because older unemployed workers are
facing different choices, we investigate the effects of pension reform on two distinct exits. For this reason, we
distinguish two separate exit destination (columns (4) to (9)): Unemployed workers can return to employment or
leave labour force for sickness, family leave or retirement which we group together under the label ’inactivity’.
Turning now to the effects of the reform on unemployment exit to employment. Table 6 column (4) shows that
the differences are strong and significant between treated and control groups. The 2003 reform reduces the
probability of leaving unemployment for employment by 30 percentage points. The reform does not produce
the desired effects on employment for the oldest, that is to say an increase in the re-employment of unemployed
workers. Part of this finding may be found in restriction in access to early retirement for long careers since the
2003 pension reform, which leads to a substitution effect between unemployment and early retirement exits.
According to official statistics of the Ministry of Labour and Employment, number of workers who leave the
labour force for long careers decreased from 119,620 in 2008 to 24,017 in 2009, a decline of 80% over one
year7. Older workers in unemployment are not encourage to actively search an employment, given that, they
are eligible for long unemployment benefit duration. This is confirmed by the sharp increase of unemployment
rate of older workers after the 2008 crisis. The French unemployment rate of workers aged between 55 and 64
7Statistics can be found at: http://dares.travail-emploi.gouv.fr/dares-etudes-et-statistiques/statistiques-de-a-a-z/article/la-
cessation-anticipee-d-activite-les-series-annuelles
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years old increases by 1.4 percentage point just after the 2008 crisis and continuously rise thereafter (see Figure
2). This raises issues related to difficulties encountered by senior unemployed to find a new job and reluctance
of employers to hire them.
Tightening eligibility criteria of early retirement schemes results in fewer exit to inactivity, at least for one
birth cohort, and in fewer exit to employment. Older workers use unemployment as an alternative way to leave
labour force before being eligible to pension age. On the other hand, the deterioration of health status could
also explain why unemployment route is used as bridge until retirement. Indeed, literature reports that a poor
health state tends to decrease the job opportunity of individuals. For instance, the study of Behaghel, Blanchet,
Debrand and Roger (2011) on French data shows the correlation between being unemployed and being in bad
health. Unemployed workers are more likely to prone to a poor health than employed workers. Therefore older
unemployed workers in bad health are condemned to remain unemployed because they have a lower probability
of being hired than those in good health. Transition out of labour force can take place trough unemployment
exit.8.
Reforms can affect transition out of unemployment in different way workers among treated cohorts. To see
whether pension reforms have different effects within the treated group, we split treated group into four birth
cohorts. The interaction between birth cohort and post-treatment period provides the effect of pension reform
across birth cohorts (see Table 6 column (6)). The coefficients estimates on the interaction between post-
treatment period and cohort dummies, D1949 ∗Postt toD1952 ∗Postt, indicate whether the pension reform has
heterogeneous effect among birth cohorts. The interaction terms show that the reform has not the same intensity
among treated birth cohorts. The reform implies a significant decline of the probability to experience an exit
from unemployment only for the 1951 birth cohort, while for the other cohorts the coefficients associated to the
effect of the reform are negative, but statistically insignificant and smaller.
Concerning the transition into employment, D1949 ∗ Postt to D1952 ∗ Postt give now the estimated effects
on the reform on the opportunity of re-employment of older workers. These results indicate that pension
reform does not affect birth cohorts in same way. The effects of pension reform have the unexpected sign (i.e.
we expect a positive sign for pension reform, which would mean that the reform increases the probability of
reemployment of unemployed workers) and are negative and significant for only two cohorts: the 1949 and
the 1951. The job take-up significantly declines after the policy change, particularly for the 1951 birth cohort.
The implementation of the pension reform tends to decrease the job take-up of older unemployed workers.
When undertaken separately for males and females, the effects of pension reform on job take-up are only
significant for males. The results are presented in Table 8 through gender and destination exits. The coefficient
8Unfortunately there is no information available on health status in FLFS
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which measures the change of the job take-up is strongly negative for males, which suggest a decline of exit
to employment. The decomposition by birth cohorts shows that all cohorts treated are all significant, and more
pronounced in size than for females. In all cases, the negative effects of pension reform are mostly driven by
male unemployed workers in the 1949 and 1951 birth cohorts.
4.2. Effects of the 2003 Reform on Exit to Inactivity
Turning now to the impact of the 2003 reform on exit to inactivity, Table 6 columns (7) and (8) show that
the estimated coefficient DTreated ∗ Postt is negative but not significant, indicating that differences in exit to
inactivity are small and not significant between treated and control groups after the policy change. There is no
evidence that the pension reform reduces the exit to inactivity state (see Table 6 columns (7) to (9)). However,
pension reform could have different effects according to the cohort. In order to achieve this, we investigate
whether the pension reform has heterogeneous effect among birth cohorts. Table 6 column (9) presents the
results from estimation among treated cohorts. Pension reform does not affect any of cohorts in treatment
group except for one. The coefficient that captures the effect of pension reform is negative and significant at
10 level for the 1951 cohort, for which pension reform decreases the exits to inactivity. When the estimation
is taken separately for males and females (see Table 8), the effects of pension reform on inactivity are only
significant for males. In almost all cases, we only observe a reduction of exit to unemployment for the male
unemployed workers in the 1951 birth cohorts following passage of pension reform. The inactivity response is
strong this cohort of workers since the reform leads to a sizeable fall in exit to inactivity. Except this case, the
2003 pension reform has no impact on the exit out of unemployment, which can be explained by the fact the
reform has focused more on keeping workers in employment rather than hiring or encouraging them to return
to work.
To sum up, the 2003 pension reform has some effects on leaving unemployment, particularly on the exit to
employment. The findings indicate that the effect of the reform is driven by particular birth cohorts. As
there are fewer exits from unemployment to employment and to inactivity for cohorts affected by the reform,
unemployed workers stay longer in unemployment after the policy change. Unemployment is used as a bridge
to early retirement mostly due to strengthening of early retirement schemes and, given that in France, older
workers have favorable unemployment insurance cover. The French insurance system encourages unemployed
older individuals not to look for work, since they can remain unemployed and draw insurance benefits until
they reach the age of retirement. Unemployed older workers can claim unemployment insurance benefits for
three years for individuals over 50, while it is two years for those under 50 but seven years after the age of 58.
Older persons continue to receive benefits until they reach the full retirement age. All these measures do not
encourage unemployed persons to looking for work. This is for this reason that a large number of older workers
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leave their jobs voluntary through a negotiated separation with the employer (”Les ruptures conventionnelles”)
which allows them to receive unemployment insurance benefits until the age of full rate retirement is reached.
4.3. Effects of the 2010 Reform on Re-Employment
Now we discuss the effects of the 2010 reform on the probability of re-employment. The results are shown in
Table 7. We examine the effects of 2010 pension reform through a comparison between the period just before
the implementation of the reform, that is six months before (January to June 2011) and six months after (July
to December 2011). Individuals born from 1947 to 1952 represent the control group, and those born from
1953 to 1957 refer to the treated group. We start with exit out of unemployment, then with the transition from
unemployment to employment and conclude with the results for the transition into inactivity.
Table 7 presents the results of the 2010 reform on the probability of an unemployed older worker to leave
unemployment to go back to work or to inactivity. Columns (1) to (3) present the estimated effects of the
reform on the exit from unemployment, all exits taken together. Differences in exit between both groups are
significant. Cohorts affected by the pension reform have lower exit rates than cohorts that were not affected.
There are also fewer exits after the implementation of the law.
The results also suggest that the measures introduced in 2010 tend to improve the labour market participation of
older unemployed individuals. However when the exit state is distinguished between exit to employment or to
inactivity, another and interesting results emerge. The effect of the reform on the re-employment of unemployed
workers given on Table 7 columns (4) to (6) is positive and significant at 1 percent level. The implementation of
the 2010 pension reform increases the probability of going back to work increases by 25 percentage points. The
reform has the expected effects of helping older workers to get back employment after unemployment spells.
Measures taken to encourage employment of older workers such as financial incentives provided to companies
who hire unemployed workers over 55, or the introduction of new job contracts to employ workers over the age
of 57 seem to affect positively the reintegration into employment of seniors.
Table 7 column (6) presents estimates across the different cohorts affected by the pension reform. As in the
2003 pension reform, there is heterogeneity in the effects among cohorts. All coefficients for the interacted
terms are positive and significant in almost case, suggesting that re-employment is higher for the treated group.
All the cohorts – except the 1955 cohort – see their exit to employment increasing after the policy change.
The results undertaken separately for males and females indicates that reform does not have the same impact
(see bottom of Table 8). For the re-employment of older workers, the pension reform increases the probability
of leaving state of unemployment into employment for both males and females, but once again there is an
heterogeneity in pension reform effects among cohorts. The coefficients are statistically different from zero
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for the 1953 and 1956 birth cohorts in the case of males. For females, the coefficients on the interaction terms
show that the reform affects only the transition into employment for two birth cohorts, the 1954 and 1956 birth
cohorts.
Several authors (Hairault, Langot and Sopraseuth (2010), Legendre and Sabatier (2014)) have emphasized the
role played by institutional regulation to explain the labour market participation of older workers, especially
in France where institutions are strong and protect workers. The distance to retirement, which is the time
remaining until the eligibility age for the state pension benefits, explains how the retirement age decision affects
older workers’ employment prior to retirement. A short distance to retirement exerts negative feedbacks on both
labour supply and demand by first discouraging older workers in actively job search, and secondly because the
investment returns become less profitable as retirement approaches. Hairault, Langot and Sopraseuth (2010)
find that increasing the minimum age of retirement from age 60 to age 62 will increase the employment rate
of older workers through various channels. From demand labour point of view, employers will invest more
on employing older workers because the horizon is longer, and returns become more profitable. From supply
labour point of view, workers in employment will invest more in training while workers in unemployment will
increase job search effort and will actively look for a job when the distance from the retirement age increases.
4.4. Effects of the 2010 Reform on Inactivity
We next investigate the effect of the 2010 pension reform on the exit out of labour force. Table 7 columns (7)
to (9) provides the difference-in-differences estimates for the exit out of labour force of unemployed persons.
Regression results displayed in columns (7) and (8) show that the coefficients which capture the impact of
reform on inactivity path are positive and significant, whether seasonal effects are taken into account or not.
The 2010 pension reform increases significantly the probability of leaving unemployment to inactivity of older
unemployed workers by 20 and 16 percentage points without or with controlling for seasonality. One reason
for the positive sign could be explained by a substitution effect that leads individuals to use inactivity route
(which includes sickness benefits, disability pensions and pre-retirement) rather than ’normal’ retirement one
due to the restriction of early retirement schemes but still maintained for some categories of workers, and the
increase of minimum retirement age from the age of 60 to the age of 62. Studies have highlighted the role
played by disability benefits route to explain the low labour force participation of older workers in France
(Behaghel, Blanchet, Debrand and Roger (2011), Behaghel, Blanchet and Roger (2014)). Behaghel and al.
point out that disability and sickness benefits claims increased significantly as a consequence of the pension
system. They explain that this rise of invalidity/disability benefits demand is due to the fact that individuals
who used to not claim invalidity benefits (i.e. disability, sickness benefits) because they were eligible for a
full-rate pension at the age of 60 – more financially attractive – before the pension reform, request for it (if
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they are eligible for these benefits) after the reform which removes the possibility to take retirement early at the
age of 60. This results in substitution between inactivity and other retirement pathways. The rise in take-up of
invalidity benefits after change in length contributions is also found in Bozio (2008) in which an increase in
required number of quarters for a full-rate pension involves a rise of receiving disability benefits of 2 percentage
point. Hence, the increase in the minimum retirement age added to the progressive abolition of the DRE, with
a sizeable decline of around 35% from January 2011 to December 2011 in comparison with a fall around 8%
over the 2008-2009 period9, can explain why pension reform increases the probability of leaving labour force
early through inactivity pathway. Restrict access to unemployment insurance increases the importance of other
routes which become more accessible (with, for example, the extension of long careers, disability schemes or
early retirement for workers with difficult working conditions) to exit labour force early .
We also investigate the heterogeneity of the 2010 pension reform by splitting the sample into five birth cohorts.
Column (9) of Table 7 presents estimates across cohorts affected by the pension reform. The results indicate
that the pension reform affects significantly mainly one cohort in the case of exit to inactivity and, to a lesser
extent, the 1957 cohort (it is only significant at 10 level). The result indicates that the 2010 reform leads to an
increase of the exit to inactivity for the older cohort affected by the policy change. The reform increases the
probability of leaving unemployment for inactivity by 30 percentage points for this cohort, while the transition
to inactivity is not affected for the other ones.
When we analyse how the reform influence the transitions separately for males and females, we find again that
the reform affects them differently in treated group (see bottom of Table 8 columns (5)-(6) and (11)-(12)). The
coefficients for the interaction terms indicate that the reform impact on exit to inactivity is mainly driven by
male unemployed workers, and especially by two cohorts: the 1953 and 1956 cohorts who react strongly to the
reform. For the unemployed women, columns (11) and (12) report estimates of equation (1) for women. All
estimates are smaller in size than for males, and are not statistically significant. There is therefore no evidence
of a change in inactivity exit for women following the passage of the 2010 pension reform.
5. Robustness
In this section, we perform sensitivity checks of our findings. We begin by testing the common trend assumption
of the difference-in-differences approach. The difference-in-differences approach assumes a common trend
between treated and control groups. In other words, the trend in exit out of unemployment would have been
the same for workers affected by the reform and those not affected without the reform. We perform a placebo
9Figures can be found at: www.pole-emploi.org
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test to check the assumption of the common trend. For that, we estimate equation (1) for 2007 and 2008, two
years before the implementation of the reform. We use the same treated and control groups and we assume
that there is a change in policy that begins in 2008 while in reality there is no change in pension entitlement
criteria during this period. If the common trend assumption is valid, we expect to find not evidence of effect of
the reform. In Table 10 the coefficient which refers to the effect of the ’pseudo’ pension reform is close to zero
and statistically insignificant. It implies that macro effects or other institutional changes had a similar impact
on both groups and provides the validity of results. The difference-in-differences seems to be appropriate.
Finally, estimates may depend on period used for the difference-in-difference estimation. In order to check the
sensitivity of our results, we try several other sets of difference-in-differences regressions by varying the period
of analysis, that is including/dropping years dummies in pre and post-period of analysis. Treated and control
groups are the same that those used in main analysis. First, the impact of the 2003 pension reform is analysed by
increasing the observation period one year before and after the policy change to one year before and two years
after. The results presented in Table 11 columns (1) to (6) for the three exit cases. Starting with the likelihood of
leaving unemployment without differencing exit destination, the decline is less pronounced but significant than
those obtained in our main estimation. However the results are quite similar, and indicate that the 2003 pension
reform decreases the probability to leave unemployment. The results are qualitatively and quantitively robust
to the variation of the period window around the treatment threshold. Regarding the impact on re-employment,
we find again negative signs of coefficients associated to the effect of the reform, after controlling for seasonal
effects or not. Column 4 of Table 11 indicates that the pension reform is accompanied by a drop in job take-up
of 20 percentage points. This decline is smaller compared to those obtained in Table 7, but it is significant at
5 percent level. Finally, columns (5) and (6) of Table 11 indicate that there is no effect on the exit to inactivity
induced by the reform.
Turning to the results of the 2010 pension reform, we re-estimate the effects of the reform by including 2010
year as the pre-treatment years in the analysis sample and January 2010 to June 2011 is defined as the post-
treatment years, and July 2011 to December 2011 as the control year. The results shown in Table 11 columns (7)
to (12) for the exit from unemployment, to employment and to inactivity respectively. The findings are different
from to those obtained in Table 7, except for the effects on exit to employment which are qualitatively similar.
The estimates in Table 11 columns (8) illustrate that the reform leads to a decline in exit from unemployment,
while the sign is significantly positive when the observation period is smaller. The reform again leads to a small
increase in transition from unemployment into employment (column 10), while the effects on exit to inactivity
are unaffected by the reform (columns (11) and (12)).
These findings suggest that the probability of re-employment of older unemployed workers decline after the
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2003 pension reform, while it does not affect the probability of leaving unemployment to inactivity. However
the results are mixed as regards the 2010 reform as we find evidence that this second reform leads to a rise in
the re-employment of cohorts affected by the reform, while there is no impact on the exit to inactivity.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we use a difference-in-differences approach to explore the impact of French reform pension on
employment outcomes of unemployed older workers. Using the French Labour Force Survey for the 2003-2011
period, we attempt to identify the effects of two main pension reforms, the 2003 and 2010 pension reforms, on
the exit out of unemployment of unemployed older workers. We also look at the effects of these both reforms
on the re-employment of older unemployed workers, as well as on their exits to inactivity.
We find evidence of an impact of the 2003 French reforms on the re-employment of unemployed seniors. In
almost all cases, the coefficients associated with the impact of the reform pension are significantly negative.
The 2003 pension reform decreases the exit of unemployed older workers to employment. However the 2003
pension reform does not influence the probability of leaving unemployment for inactivity. The coefficients
associated to the effect of pension reform have the expected signs but are not significant. The reform adopted
in 2003 had only impact on re-employment of unemployed older individuals. When undertaken separately
for males and females, we find that the effects of pension reform are mainly driven by males unemployed
workers, while the effects are statistically insignificant for females. We also find substantial heterogeneity in
pension reform effects among birth cohorts. We note that unemployed workers stay longer in unemployment
after the 2003 policy change: Unemployment is used as a bridge to early retirement. This result is consistent
with previous studies (Bozio (2008), Garcı´a-Pe´rez, Jime´nez-Martı´n and Sa´nchez-Martı´n (2013), Staubli and
Zweimu¨ller (2013)) which conclude that the increase in the early retirement age leads to a higher unemployment
rate of older workers.
We also investigate the effects of the 2010 reform on the probability of re-employment and inactivity of unem-
ployed older persons. The reform increases the probability to return to work of older workers, and also leads to
a rise of the transition from unemployment for inactivity. The pension reform affects mainly male older work-
ers and the impact is different within treated group. Our conclusion remains true after considering alternative
specifications.
Reforms in pension system implemented since the last decade have pushed up the exit to inactivity or to un-
employment of older unemployed workers: Unemployment and inactivity are used as alternative pathways to
leave the labour force early. However the 2010 pension reform has address the difficulties encountered by
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unemployed older people by increasing the probability of going back to work. Overall, the French pension sys-
tem needs further reforms to encourage older workers to actively participate into labour market. As all policy
measures should be taken to encourage employers to hire older workers. In the interests of sustainability of
the French social system, it would be necessary to reform also labour demand side by increasing measures to
provide incentives to promote the labour demand for older workers.
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Table 1: Means of the demographic variables for individuals present in 2008-2009/2011 and which














No qualification 0.3814 0.3831
(0.0179) (0.0145)
Duration in unemployment
Less than 1 month 0.0230 0.0287
(0.0056) (0.0050)
1 to 2 months 0.1294 0.1259
(0.0127) (0.010)
3 to 5 months 0.1539 0.1277
(0.0136) (0.0101)
6 to 11 months 0.1294 0.1583
(0.0127) (0.011)
12 to 17 months 0.1510 0.1416
(0.0135) (0.010)
18 to 23 months 0.0676 0.0722
(0.0095) (0.0078)
24 to 36 months 0.1237 0.1388
(0.0124) (0.0105)
More than 36 months 0.2215 0.2064
(0.0157) (0.0123)
Number of observations 734 1125
Note: Standard deviations in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: own calculations based on FLFS, 2003-2011
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Table 2: Means of the demographic variables in treatment and control groups for individuals
present in 2008-2009 period and which experience an exit out of to unemployment or not
Treatment Control Difference
Age 57.9 61.9 -4.00***
(0.0485) (0.0945) (0.1021)
Male 0.5488 0.5889 -0.0400
(0.0215) (0.0386) (0.0444)
Single 0.4078 0.4478 -0.0399
(0.0213) (0.0390) (0.0399)
Highest degree
College/University 0.1684 0.2180 -0.0495
(0.0160) (0.0301) (0.0325)
Baccalaure´at 0.1153 0.1648 -0.0495
(0.0136) (0.0271) (0.0282)
Brevet/CAP/BEP 0.3223 0.2712 0.0510
(0.0200) (0.0325) (0.0390)
No qualification 0.3937 0.3457 0.0480
(0.0209) (0.0347) (0.0410)
Duration in unemployment
Less than 1 month 0.0207 0.0307 -0.010
(0.0061) (0.0135) (0.0134)
1 to 2 months 0.1355 0.1104 0.0249
(0.0148) (0.0246) (0.0300)
3 to 5 months 0.1616 0.1288 0.0328
(0.0159) (0.0263) (0.0323)
6 to 11 months 0.1428 0.0858 0.0569
(0.0151) (0.0220) (0.0300)
12 to 17 months 0.1447 0.1717 -0.0270
(0.0152) (0.0296) (0.0320)
18 to 23 months 0.0620 0.0858 -0.0238
(0.0104) (0.0220) (0.0676)
24 to 36 months 0.1259 0.1165 0.0093
(0.0143) (0.0252) (0.0093)
More than 36 months 0.2067 0.2699 -0.0631
(0.0175) (0.0348) (0.0371)
Number of observations 734 546 188
Note: Standard deviations in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: own calculations based on FLFS, 2003-2011
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Table 3: Means of the demographic variables in treatment and control groups for individuals
present in 2011 and which experience an exit out of unemployment or not
Treatment Control Difference
Age 55.9 60.3 -4.4***
(0.0517) (0.0833) (0.0945)
Male 0.4901 0.5303 -0.0402
(0.0181) (0.0262) (0.0319)
Single 0.4311 0.4364 -0.0052
(0.0179) (0.0260) (0.0316)
Highest degree
College/University 0.1218 0.1988 -0.0770***
(0.0118) (0.0210) (0.0224)
Baccalaure´at 0.1192 0.1408 -0.0216
(0.0117) (0.0183) (0.0212)
Brevet/CAP/BEP 0.3486 0.3342 0.0143
(0.0172) (0.0248) (0.0303)
No qualification 0.4102 0.3259 0.0842***
(0.0178) (0.0246) (0.0309)
Duration in unemployment
Less than 1 month 0.0430 0.0416 0.0013
(0.0211) (0.0237) (0.0318)
1 to 2 months 0.1182 0.0972 0.0210
(0.0336) (0.0351) (0.0492)
3 to 5 months 0.1182 0.1212 -0.0067
(0.0159) (0.0263) (0.0323)
6 to 11 months 0.2043 0.125 0.0793
(0.0420) (0.0392) (0.0589)
12 to 17 months 0.1397 0.1666 -0.0268
(0.0361) (0.0442) (0.0565)
18 to 23 months 0.0860 0.0138 0.0721**
(0.0292) (0.0138) (0.0721)
24 to 36 months 0.1182 0.125 -0.0067
(0.0336) (0.0392) (0.0515)
More than 36 months 0.1505 0.1666 -0.0161
(0.0372) (0.0442) (0.0575)
Number of observations 1125 763 362
Note: Standard deviations in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: own calculations based on FLFS, 2003-2011
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Table 4: Transition matrix from unemployment before (January to December 2008) and after pol-
icy changes (January to December 2009)
Before After
All Control Treated All Control Treated
Unemployment 47 29 18 255 198 57
(20.3%) (17.4%) (27.7%) (50.8%) (52.2%) (46.3%)
Employment 53 46 7 66 46 20
(22.8%) (27.5%) (10.7%) (13.1%) (12.2%) (16.3%)
Inactivity 132 92 40 181 135 46
(56.9%) (55.1%) (61.6%) (36.1%) (35.6%) (37.4%)
Table 5: Transition matrix from unemployment before (January to June 2011) and after policy
changes (July to December 2011)
Before After
All Control Treated All Control Treated
Unemployment 93 17 76 553 164 389
(34.2%) (18.9%) (41.7%) (65.2%) (60.3%) (66.9%)
Employment 76 22 54 120 23 97
(27.9%) (24.4%) (29.7%) (14.2%) (8.5%) (16.7%)
Inactivity 103 51 52 180 85 95
(37.9%) (56.7%) (28.6%) (20.6%) (31.2%) (16.4%)
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Table 6: Effects of the 2003 reform one year before (2008) and one year after the policy change (2009)
Exit Employment Inactivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DTreated ∗ Postt -0.165** -0.136* -0.394*** -0.302** -0.116 -0.0898
(0.0821) (0.0791) (0.121) (0.117) (0.0916) (0.0881)
Date of Birth
1949 -0.146 -0.433** -0.163
(0.106) (0.197) (0.122)
1950 -0.0787 -0.286* 0.00109
(0.106) (0.156) (0.121)
1951 -0.255** -0.450*** -0.223*
(0.101) (0.167) (0.120)
1952 -0.0894 -0.208 -0.0232
(0.101) (0.139) (0.114)
Seasonality No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 734 734 734 420 420 420 623 623 623
Adjusted R2 0.100 0.217 0.212 0.133 0.242 0.226 0.092 0.210 0.227
Notes: In addition to variables shown, an intercept and controls for education, sex, marital status, household
composition, a dummy for the treatment group and a dummy for the post-treatment period were included in all
specifications.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at individual level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: own calculations based on FLFS, 2003-2011
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Table 7: Effects of the 2010 Reform, 6 months before (January to June 2011) and 6 months after the policy change (July to December
2011)
Exit Employment Inactivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DTreated ∗ Postt 0.175*** 0.126** 0.242** 0.224*** 0.202*** 0.157**
(0.0648) (0.0534) (0.0947) (0.0771) (0.0750) (0.0644)
Date of Birth
1953 0.190** 0.262** 0.284***
(0.0939) (0.117) (0.110)
1954 0.0981 0.236** 0.128
(0.0805) (0.103) (0.0918)
1955 0.0278 0.0571 0.132
(0.0836) (0.107) (0.112)
1956 0.243** 0.399*** 0.208*
(0.100) (0.130) (0.116)
1957 0.0755 0.177* 0.0322
(0.0774) (0.106) (0.0922)
Seasonality No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 1,125 1,125 1,125 842 842 842 943 943 943
Adjusted R2 0.092 0.338 0.330 0.084 0.286 0.279 0.108 0.338 0.336
Notes: In addition to variables shown, an intercept and controls for education, sex, marital status, household composition,
a dummy for the treatment group and a dummy for the post-treatment periodwere included in all specifications.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at individual level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: own calculations based on FLFS, 2003-2011
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Table 8: Effects of the Reforms: One year before (2008) and one year after (2009) the 2003 reform, and six months before (January to June
2011) and six months after the 2010 Reform (July 2011 to December 2011) by gender
Males Females
Exit Employment Inactivity Exit Employment Inactivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
2003 Reform
DTreated ∗ Postt -0.157 -0.569*** -0.041 -0.069 0.072 -0.148
(0.099) (0.146) (0.111) (0.126) (0.174) (0.135)
Date of Birth
1949 -0.106 -0.637** -0.0003 -0.122 0.229 -0.287
(0.143) (0.254) (0.161) (0.154) (0.287) (0.181)
1950 -0.0632 -0.498** 0.086 -0.072 -0.024 -0.114
(0.106) (0.205) (0.166) (0.169) (0.267) (0.182)
1951 -0.381*** -0.940*** -0.317*** 0.034 0.339 -0.010
(0.111) (0.137) (0.121) (0.194) (0.273) (0.234)
1952 -0.0518 -0.383** 0.083 -0.095 0.069 -0.152
(0.133) (0.176) (0.154) (0.154) (0.234) (0.166)
Seasonality Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 410 410 241 241 347 347 324 324 179 179 276 276
Adjusted R2 0.221 0.237 0.257 0.284 0.242 0.245 0.191 0.201 0.174 0.211 0.211 0.228
2010 Reform
DTreated ∗ Postt 0.142* 0.263** 0.202** 0.117 0.224** 0.099
(0.074) (0.118) (0.092) (0.079) (0.104) (0.093)
Date of Birth
1953 0.333 0.462*** 0.417*** 0.065 0.118 0.170
(0.144) (0.178) (0.158) (0.129) (0.154) (0.165)
1954 0.031 0.159 0.114 0.158 0.367** 0.099
(0.103) (0.145) (0.128) (0.125) (0.147) (0.134)
1955 0.005 0.086 0.049 0.054 0.051 0.171
(0.109) (0.147) (0.148) (0.127) (0.156) (0.168)
1956 0.314** 0.445** 0.390** 0.181 0.405** 0.042
(0.149) (0.189) (0.173) (0.139) (0.184) (0.157)
1957 0.027 0.162 -0.016 0.126 0.200 0.047
(0.094) (0.147) (0.112) (0.124) (0.158) (0.144)
Seasonality Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 566 566 422 422 466 466 559 559 420 420 477 477
Adjusted R2 0.331 0.333 0.290 0.299 0.334 0.342 0.315 0.313 0.239 0.246 0.333 0.325
Notes: In addition to variables shown, an intercept and controls for education, sex, marital status, household composition, a dummy for the
treatment group and a dummy for the post-treatment period were included in all specifications.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at individual level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1




Table 9: French pension reforms and their main changes on length contributions for a full-rate pension and on age of retirement
Pension Reform Date of birth Contribution length Minimum age Age of retiremet
(in quarters) of retirement without required years of contribution
1943 and before 150 (37 years and 2 quarters) 60 65
1993 Reform 1944 152 (38 years) 60 65
(2003 Reform for public sector) 1946 156 (39 years)
1947 158 (39 years and 2 quarters)
1948 160 (40 years)
2003 Reform 1949 161 (40 years and 1 quarter) 60 65
(public and private sectors) 1950 162 (40 years and 2 quarters)
1951 163 (40 years and 3 quarters)
1952 164 (41 years and 3 quarters)
2010 Reform 1953-54 165 (42 years) 62 67
(public and private sectors) 1955-57 166 (41 years and 2 quarters)
1958-60 167 (41 years and 3 quarters)
1961-63 168 (42 years)
1964-66 169 (42 years and 1 quarter)
1967-69 170 (42 years and 2 quarters)
1970-72 171 (42 years and 3 quarters)
1973 and over 172 (43 years)
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Table 10: Placebo test: One year before (2007) and one year after the ’pseudo’ reform (2008)
Exit Employment Inactivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DTreated 0.0141 0.0205 0.154* 0.169** -0.00787 -0.0137
(0.0566) (0.0573) (0.0882) (0.0828) (0.0661) (0.0675)
Postt -0.106 0.00303 -0.144 0.0203 -0.0695 0.0384
(0.0678) (0.0664) (0.0929) (0.0933) (0.0741) (0.0738)
Quarter 1 0.125** 0.0317 0.165***
(0.0589) (0.0741) (0.0626)
Quarter 2 0.378*** 0.410*** 0.411***
(0.0434) (0.0706) (0.0519)
Quarter 3 0.329*** 0.214*** 0.374***
(0.0463) (0.0755) (0.0529)
DTreated ∗ Postt -0.0655 -0.0470 -0.0236 -0.0522 -0.116 -0.0754
(0.0790) (0.0757) (0.108) (0.101) (0.0881) (0.0857)
Constant 0.678*** 0.432*** 0.124 -0.0564 0.702*** 0.425***
(0.102) (0.105) (0.123) (0.130) (0.109) (0.114)
Observations 734 734 397 397 610 610
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.160 0.084 0.182 0.046 0.155
Notes: In addition to variables shown, an intercept and controls for education, sex,
marital status, household composition were included in all specifications.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at individual level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: own calculations based on FLFS, 2003-2011
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Table 11: Effects of the Reforms: One year before (2008) and two years after (2009-2010) the 2003 reform, and one year before (January
2010 to June 2011) and six months after the 2010 Reform (July 2011 to December 2011)
2003 Reform 2010 Reform
Exit Employment Inactivity Exit Employment Inactivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
DTreated 0.0705 0.0721 0.195** 0.155** 0.00209 0.00820 -0.132*** -0.0674*** 0.0121 -0.000648 -0.232*** -0.218***
(0.0641) (0.0588) (0.0763) (0.0719) (0.0701) (0.0642) (0.0264) (0.0246) (0.0382) (0.0359) (0.0310) (0.0301)
Postt 0.234*** 0.242*** 0.299*** 0.224** 0.210*** 0.216*** -0.169*** -0.201*** -0.286*** -0.127*** -0.221***
(0.0633) (0.0594) (0.0902) (0.0917) (0.0699) (0.0663)
DTreated ∗ Postt -0.151** -0.153** -0.252** -0.211** -0.0964 -0.105 0.0195 -0.198*** 0.0943 0.100* -0.0109 -0.0199
(0.0736) (0.0691) (0.105) (0.101) (0.0827) (0.0782) (0.0515) (0.0341) (0.0608) (0.0588) (0.0565) (0.0553)
Seasonality No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 991 991 467 467 807 807 1,947 1,947 1,256 1,256 1,496 1,496
Adjusted R-squared 0.038 0.075 0.057 0.112 0.045 0.080 0.0402 0.0986 0.0175 0.0920 0.0741 0.1296
Notes: In addition to variables shown, an intercept and controls for education, sex, marital status, household composition, a dummy for the treatment group and
a dummy for the post-treatment period were included in all specifications. The control group consists of workers born between 1944 and 1948 for the 2003 pension
reform (columns (1)-(6)), and between 1947 and 1952 for the 2010 pension reform (columns (7)-(12))
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at individual level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: own calculations based on FLFS, 2003-2011
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